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Damages are the estimated reparation in money for a detri-
ment or injury sustained; compensation or satisfaction imposed by
law for a wrong or injury caused by a violation of a legal right.
Damages are either substantial or nominal, according to whether
there has been actual or merely nominal loss.
Legal damages are limited to those which are the natural and
proximate result of the wrong done.
Direct or general damages are those which are the necessary and
immediate consequence of the wrong-while indirect or special
damages are sometimes granted in respect of its remoter conse-
quences.
i. Damnum Absque Injuria.
Injury without wrong. Damage arising as the consequence of
acts which others might lawfully do, or where the general good
is promoted through operating unfavorably upon rights of indi-
viduals.
2. De Minimis Non Curat Lex.
The law does not take notice of trifles.
Rule: There can be no recovery in damages for such acts as
may be justified by an express provision of law, or may have
arisen by acts of others in the lawful enjoyment and exercise of
their own rights, and in the management of their business. Dam-
ages to be recoverable must be the proximate consequence of the
act complained of; it must be the consequence that follows the
act, and not the secondary result from the first consequences
either alone or in combination with other circumstances.
3. Nominal Damages.
-Such damages (six cents) as are awarded in vindication of a
violated legal right, where no actual damages have been suffered.
The law seeks to give compensation and indemnity and nothing
beyond it. Eaton vs. Lyman, 30 Wis. 41. See also Barnard vs.
Cohen, 165 Wis. 417, 162 N. W. 48o.
4. Liquidation of Damages.
Such damages as are stipulated by the parties themselves at the
time of making the contract and is said to be within the contempla-
tion of the parties. Its purpose is to make definite that which
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otherwise might be indefinite and avoids the probable inability of
being unable to prove damages with certainty. Wagner vs. Caza-
ker, 11:2 Wis. 532, 88 N. W. 599.
5. Discretionary Damages.
Damages awarded by a jury, which in its sound judgment, after
hearing the evidence, will compensate the complainant for the
damages sustained by the unlawful act of another. Nelson vs.
Goddard & Co., 162 Wis. 66, 155 N. W. 943.
In case the damages awarded, however, are monstrous and
enormous and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaim
against at first blush, the court may order a new trial or order
the damages reduced. The same rule will apply where the dam-
ages are inadequate. Whitney vs. Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 409, 27
N. W. 39.
(a) Aggravation. Additional damages awarded for unlawful
acts accompanied by ill will or malice. Such damages are called
punitive damages and are awarded on the theory of punishment to
the wrong doer. They may be greater or less than the compensa-
tory damages. Draper vs. Baker, 61 Wis. 450, 21 N. W. 527,
Alberts vs. Alberts, 78 Wis. 72, 47 N. W. 95; Gatzow vs. Buening,
io6 Wis. 1, 18, 8I N. W. 1003.
(b) Exemplary. Exemplary, vindictive, or punitive damages
are such as blend together the interests of society and of the ag-
grieved individual and are not only a recompense to the sufferer,
but a punishment to the offended. Exemplary damages do not
follow compensatory damages as a matter of right, but they are
a question for the jury to decide. Robinson vs. Superior R. T.
Co., 94 Wis. 345, 68 N. W. 691.
The practice in Wisconsin is to make the two separate and
distinct awards. Luther vs. Shaw, 157 Wis. 231, 147 N. W. 17.
The rule of exemplary damages applies to corporations as well
as individuals when it can be shown that the corporation ratified
the malicious act of its officer or agent. Craker vs. C. & N. WV.
R. R. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504; Wilson vs. Young, 31
Wis. 574; McWilliams vs. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424; Bass vs. C. & N.
W. R. R. Co., 36 Wis. 463.
Exemplary damages are not recoverable in an equitable action,
since damages are auxiliary to main relief. Karns vs. Allen, 135
Wis. 48, 115 N. W. 357. Nor where the compensatory damages
recoverable are merely nominal. Barnard vs. Cohen, I65 Wis. 417,
162 N. W. A8o.
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(c) Mitigation. A withdrawal or atonement. Something that
lessens the wrong and is recognized by law because of the frailties
of human nature. The purpose of showing mitigation in civil
actions is to reduce the amount of the damages. Birchard vs.
Booth, 4 Wis. 75; Wilson vs. Young, 31 Wis. 574; Corcoran vs.
Harran, 55 Wis. 120, 12 N. W. 468; Morely vs. Dunbar, 24 Wis.
183.
But the amount received by plaintiff under an accident insur-
ance policy, or under the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act,
or when the salary of the injured person has been continued dur-
ing his disability, is not to be considered in diminution of dam-
ages. Cunnien vs. Superior T. W. Co., 175 Wis. 172, 184 N. W.
767.
6. Compensatory Damages.
Such damages as will actually pay for the injury suffered. They
are divided into two classes-direct and consequential damages.
Gatzow vs. Buening, io6 Wis. I, 1g, 81 N. W. 1003.
Direct Damages are such as flow from the wrongful act without
any intervening cause.
Consequential Damages are such damages as are not produced
without the concurrence of some other event attributable to the
same origin or cause. Kellogg vs. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 26 Wis.
224; Vosburg vs. Putney, 78 Wis. 84, 47 N. W. 99; Oliver vs.
La Valle, 36 Wis. 592; McNamara vs. Village of Clintonville, 62
Wis. 207, 22 N. W. 472.
(a) Contract. The rule for damages in actions on breach of
contract. Where two persons have made a contract, which one
of them has broken, the damages with respect to such breach of
contract should be either such as may fairly and substantially be
considered as arising naturally-that is, according to the usual
course of things-from such breach of contract itself, or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable
result of the breach of it. English rule: It is the duty of the
plaintiff to consider the contract breached as soon as repudiated.
American rule: Plaintiff can sue at once or wait until the time
of completion of the contract and then sue. Brown vs. C. M. &
St. P. Ry Co., 54 Wis. 342, I1 N. W. 356; Guetzkow Bros. Co.
vs. Andrews et al., 92 Wis. 214, 66 N. W. 119; Hammer vs.
Schoenfelder, 47 Wis. 455, 2 N. W. 1129; Kelley, Maus & Co.
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vs. La Crosse C. Co., 12o Wis. 84, 97 N. W. 674; Hadley vs.
Baxendale, 1854, Court of Exchequer.
Telegraph Companies. They are liable for any damages re-
sulting from failure to deliver messages. Damages for mental
anguish caused by delay in delivery of telegrams may be recov-
ered not to exceed $5oo. Section 1778 (5). But this statute
does not apply to delivery of interstate telegrams. Dune vs.
W. U. Tel. Co., 165 Wis. I9o, I61 N._ W. 755.
(b) Avoidable Consequences. It is the duty of the injured
party to minimize the damages as much as possible. A person
has no right to put others to an expense of such a nature as he
would not, as a reasonable man, incur on his own account.
M. Ca-meson vs. White, 74 Wis. 425, 43 N. W. 155; Yorton vs.
iMilwaukee L. S. & W. R. Co., 62 Wis. 367, 21 N. W. 516;
Salladay vs. Dodgeville, 85 Wis. 318, 55 N. W. 696; Driver vs.
W. U. R. R. Co., 32 Wis. 569, 14 Am. Rep. 726.
(c) Certainty of Proof. Damages must be such as may fairly
be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties
when they made the contract ;-that is, it must be such ap might
naturally be expected to follow violation, and they must be certain,
both in nature and in respect to the cause from which they pro-
ceed.
Profits, speculative, conjectural or remote, are not generally
regarded as an element in estimating damages. Possible or prob-
able gains are too remote and cannot be recovered unless such
future profits are in the contemplation of the parties when the
contract is made and there is no other basis upon which to esti-
mate such damages. Schumaker vs. Heinemann, 99 Wis. 251, 74
N. W. 785; Flick vs. Wetherbee, 20 Wis. 412; Wright vs. Mul-
vaney, 78 Wis. 89, 46 N. W. 1O45; Anderson vs. Sloan, 72 Wis.
566, 40 N. W. 214.
(d) Entirety of Recovery. The princiile is settled beyond dis-
pute that a judgment concludes the right of parties in respect to
the cause of action stated in the pleadings in which it is rendered,
and it is a rule that when a 'thing directly wrongful in itself is
done to a -an, in itself a cause of action, he must, if he sues in
respect of it, do so once and for all. He must sue for all his
damage, past, present and future, certain and contingent. For a
breach, however, subsequent to the former suit, such actual dam-
ages as arise may be recovered. Birchard- vs. Booth, 4 Wis. 67;
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Carl vs. Sheboygan R. R. Co., 46 Wis. 625, 1 N. W. 295; Gordon
vs. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355.
(e) Limited Interests-Personally. The general rule of dam-
ages in case of a limited interest in the plaintiff seems to be that
if the suit is brought against the owner of the property-only
the amount of such limited interest can be recovered as damages.
If, however, the suit is against a stranger, the plaintiff, even
though having only a limited interest, may recover the whole
damage. Brewster vs. Warner, 136 Mass. 57, 49 Am. Rep. 5;
White vs. Webb, 15 Conn. 302.
Realty. The general rule in damage to realty where the
plaintiff has only a limited interest such as a mortgagee, is de-
clared to rest upon the principle that the mortgage, as a security,
has been impaired, and the damages it is said, are limited to the
amount of injury to the mortgage, however great the injury to the
land may be. Seeley vs. Alden, ioo Am. Dec. 64:2; King vs. Bangs,
12o Mass. 514; Turner vs. Jackson, 39 N. J. Law Rep. 329.
7. Exact Indemnity as the Object of the Law.
(a) Value-How Determined. The value which the law gives
is reasonable or market value, i. e.. that reasonable sum which the
property would probably bring on a fair sale by a man willing
but not obliged to sell to a man willing but not obliged to pur-
chase. Allen vs. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 145 Wis. 263, 129
N. W. 1094.
All such facts and circumstances as are pertinent are admis-
sible in evidence to establish the real and ordinary market value
of the.property at the time of destruction. Schacht vs. Oriental
Transfer Co., 155 Wis. 121, 143 N. W. 1O58.
WAhen property has no specific market value, a wide range of
investigation is permitted; and though cost and value are not
synonymous terms and cost does not fix value, yet cost in such
instances may be quite convincing. Milwaukee Trust Co. vs.
Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 224, 138 N. W. 707; Maas vs. C. & N. W.
R. R. Co., 156 Wis. 145 N. W. 176.
(b) Fluctuations in Value. If the plaintiff immediately and
without unreasonable delay, commences and prosecutes his action,
it is proper that the fluctuation in the price should be exclusively
at the hazard of the defendant. In such a case, therefore, the
plaintiff is entitled to the highest price between the day when
delivery should have been made, and the day of the trial. The
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true measure of damages in all such cases is that which will com-
pletely indemnify the plaintiff for the breach of the contract.
Clark vs. Pinney, N. Y. 7 Cow. 681.
In cases of marginal contracts for the purchase of stock and a
wrongful sale by the broker, the measure of damages is not the
highest market value but only the amount of the margin actually
paid. The reason for this rule is because the plaintiff has no
money invested beyond his margins. Baker vs. Drake, 53 N. Y.
211.
Wisconsin rule: The rule allowing the plaintiff to recover the
highest value is repudiated, because it allows him to recover spec-
tlative damages, especially when a long time elapses between the
conversion and the day of trial. Ingham vs. Rankin, 47 Wis. 406, 2
N. W. 755.
(c) Addition of Value by Wrongdoer. The Wisconsin rule
holds in the case of timber severed from the soil that the measure
of recovery is the value before the property was improved, re-
"gardless of whether damage was done with or without knowledge
of the trespass. Single vs. Schneider, 30 Wis. 570; Weymouth
vs. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 17 Wis. 567.
The general rule seems to be the value of the chattel at the
time and place of the conversion, plus any damage caused to the
premises in removing the chattel.
(d) Reduction of Original Loss. Where the plaintiff's original
loss has been reduced by the application of a portion of the con-
verted property to the lawful extinguishment of the plaintiff's
debts or for the plaintiff's benefit, as much as if it had been
returned to him, such transaction operates to an equal extent in
mitigation of the damages. Cernahan vs. Chisler, 107 Wis. 645,
83 N. W. 778; Churchill vs. Welsh, 47 Wis. 39, I N. W. 398.
Where injured personal property is susceptible of repair, the
measure of damages is ordinarily the difference between the rea-
so nable market value immediately before and such value immedi-
ately after the injury, at the place thereof. Chaplean vs. Manhat-
tan Oil Co., 178 Wis. 545, 19o N. W. 361.
(e) Interest. Whenever one man retains the money of another
against his declared will, the legal compensation for the use of
money shall be charged and allowed. State vs. Milwaukee, 158
Wis. 564, 149 N. W. 579.
In the case of goods sold, interest should be allowed after the
time- of credit has elapsed and demand of payment made. Graham
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vs. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 53 Wis. 473, 491, lo N. W. 619;
Marsh .vs. Fraser, 37 Wis. 179.
In tort, in such actions as assault and battery or personal in-
jury by negligence, libel, slander, seduction, etc., interest never
creates a debt, nor becomes one, until the damages are judicially
ascertained and determined. Only from that time can the damage
include interest. First Wis. Trust Co. vs. Schmidt, 173 Wis. 477,
i8o N. W. 832.
Where the contract is entirely silent as to interest and the debt
is not punctually paid, the creditor is entitled to the legal rate of
interest by operation of law.
(f) Expenses Incurred. Expenses legitimately and essentially
incurred in reliance on a promise and loss of time by the plaintiff
because of the defendant's default, are properly recoverable as a
part of the plaintiff's damage. Johannesson vs. Borchenius, 35
Wis. 131.
In tort the plaintiff may recover as a part of his damages ex-
penses incurred as a proximate result of the injury. Berg vs.
U. S. Leather Co., 125 Wis. 26z, lO4 N. W. 6o; Davelaar vs.
Milwaukee, 123 Wis. 413, ioi N. W. 361.
(g) Court Expenses. The general rule of the U. S. Supreme
Court is that expenses incurred for counsel fees, cannot be recov-
ered as a part of the damage. Fairbanks vs. Witter, 18 Wis. 287,
86 Am. Dec. 765.
Wisconsin holds that damages sustained by reason of an in-
junction, properly include attorney's fees for services rendered
in procuring a dissolution of the injunction, and also for services
rendered by a referee. Wis. Marine Ins. Co. vs. Durner, 114
Wis. 369, 90 N. W. 435.
The general rule is, however, that sound public policy demands
that counsel fees in suits upon contracts, or for damages for torts
or upon attachments or injunctions, should not be regarded as a
proper element of damages, even when capable of being appor-
tioned and distinct from other services necessary in the case.
Weinhagen vs. Hayes, 179 Wis. 62, 19o N. W. lOO2.
8. Non Pecuniary Losses.
(a) Physical Pain. Physical pain endured is one of the three
elements of damage to be considered in personal injury cases.
The three elements are as follows:
I. Expenses to which the injured person is subjected by reason
of the injury complained of.
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2. Inconvenience and suffering naturally resulting from it.
3. Loss of earning power, temporary or permanent. Physical
pain has always been a compensable element of damages, but the
subject does not admit of a definite measure of compensation.
The assessment, therefore, is left to the good sense and unbiased
judgment of the jury. Klann vs. Minn, I61 Wis. 517, 154 N. W.
996; Brown vs. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 54 vis. 342, 1 K W.
356; Heer vs. Warren Scharf Co., II8 Wis. 57, 94 N. W. 789.
(b) Inconvenience. Damages will not be given for mere in-
convenience and annoyance such as are felt at every disappoint-
ment of one's expectations, if there is no actual physical or mental
injury. Walsh vs. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23, 24 Am. Rep. 376.
Under certain conditions, inconvenience might be made an ele-
ment of damage: i. e., unlawful invasion of the right of peace
and enjoyment of the home. Shall vs. Minn. St. P. & S. M. R.
Co., 156 Wis. 195, 145 N. W. 649.
(c) Mental Suffering. Where the wrongful act constitutes an
infringement on a legal right, mental suffering may be recovered
if it is the direct proximate and natural result of the wrongful
act, except in cases of contract; but mental anguish resulting from
mere negligence, unaccompanied with injuries to the person, can-
not be made the basis of an action for damages. Heddles vs. C.
& N. W. R. R. Co., 77 Wis. 228, 46 N. W. 115; Koerber vs.
Patek, 123 Wis. 453, I02 N. W. 40; Cracker vs. Railway Co., 36
Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504; Gatzow vs. Buenig, io6 Wis. 1, 20,
Si N. W. 1003.
9. Pecuniary Condition of Parties as Affecting the Allowance of
Damages.
(a) Of Plaintiff. Pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiff
may be inquired into. The condition in life and circumstances
of the parties may become the proper subjects for the considera-
tion of the jury in estimating damages. Potter vs. C. & N. TV.
R. R. Co., 21 Wis. 372, 94 Am. Dec. 548.
But plaintiff's poverty may not be shown merely to enhance
compensatory damages. Vosbturg vs. Putney, 78 Wis. 84,
47 N. W. 99.
(b) Of Defendant. The general reputation of the defendant
for wealth may be shown when in issue. Admission of the evi-
dence is not to establish an ability to pay, but to show the social
standing which the defendant's means do or might command.
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The amount of a defendant's pecuniary means is a factor of some
importance in an action for a breach of promise to marry. Luther
vs. Show, 157 Wis. 231, 147 N. W. 17.
While it seems that where pecuniary circumstances of a de-
fendant are admissible upon question of compensatory damages
evidence of the reputed wealth of defendant should be shown,
and upon the question of punitory damages the actual wealth of
defendant, yet where both are recoverable in the same action the
wealth of defendant may be shown by evidence of his reputed
wealth alone, defendant being allowed to rebutt by evidence of his
actual wealth. Eggett vs. Allen, lo6 Wis. 633, 82 N: W. 556;
Draper vs. Baker, 6I Wis. 450, 21 N. W. 527.
Where defendants are sued jointly for punitive damages aris-
ing out of a tort, evidence as to the wealth of the defendants is
not competent. McAllister vs. Kimberly-Clark Co., 169 Wis.
473, 173 N. W. 216.
io. Damages in Certain Specified Actions.
(a) Torts, Affecting the Person. Beyond actual damages, the
law gives what is called "added" damages. Those which grow
out of the wantonness or atrocity, so to speak, of the act. The
elements are pain and suffering which any average citizen would
be supposed to suffer under such circumstances, shame, mortifi-
cation, wrong and outrage. Buckstaff vs. Hicks, 94 Wis. 34,
68 N. W. 403.
Sorrow and mental anguish caused by the death of a relative
by the defendant's negligence are not elements of damage; nothing
can be recovered as a solatium for wounded feelings. Potter vs.
C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 21 Wis. 372, 94 Am. Dec. 548.
Sect. 4256-Wis.--Damages resulting in death shall not ex-
ceed $io,ooo-in case of injuries caused by the wrongful act of
the defendant.
(b) Affecting Property (Realty). The measure of damages
to be awarded in cases of injury to the realty by the wrongful act
of the defendant is the difference in value of the land before and
after the injury. Miller vs. Neale, 137 Wis. 426, ii N. W. 94.
For Destruction of Growing Crops. The measure of damages
the plaintiff is entitled to recover is the estimated value of the
crop standing upon the ground and the depreciated value of the
land. It is said that this is resorting to c6njecture, but it would
seem to be the only way to arrive at the value of the crop.
Folsom z's. Apple River Log Driving Co., 41 Wis. 602.
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But where growing crops are damaged by smoke, fumes and
gases throughout the growing season, the measure of damages
is the difference between the value at maturity of the probable
crop if there had been no injury and the value of the actual crop
at such time, less the expense of fitting that portion of the prob-
able crop which was prevented from maturing by the injury.
Peacock vs. Wis. Zinc Co., I77 Wis. 510, 188 N. W. 641.
(c) Personality (Conversion and Injury). Rule of damages
is the value of the property at the time and place of conversion,
with interest. Miller vs. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 153 Wis. 431,
141 N. W. 263; Gould vs. Merrill Ry. & Light Co., 139 Wis. 433,
121 N. W. 161.
(d) Detention. Rule of damages is the direct damage suffered
by the plaintiff in the loss of the use of the chattel. Interest on
the value of the article from the time of the wrongful detention
to the time of trial furnishes a just indemnity for the wrong.
Bigelow vs. Doolittle, 36 Wis. 115; Barney vs. Douglas, 22 Wis.
464.
ii. Fraud and Deceit.
Rule of damages. The plaintiff may recover as damages the
difference between the actual value and that value which was
represented by the defendant. Spear vs. Hiles, 67 Wis. 350,
30 N. W. 56.
12. Certain Specific Contract Actions.
(a) In Those Respecting Services. The Wisconsin rule is
that one who breaches his contract to furnish personal services,
if he has received no compensation up to the time of his breach,
can recover nothing for the services already performed under the
breached contract. Hildebrand vs. Am. Fine Arts Co., io 9 Wis.
171, 85 N. W. 268.
If the contract is breached by the employer, the plaintiff may
sue immediately and recover in quantum reruit or he may wait
until the expiration of the contract and recover the whole amount,
less his reasonable earnings received during the waiting period.
Gordon vs. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355.
(b) In Those Respecting Personalty. Breaches of Warranty.
Rule of damages: The difference between the actual value and
the value of the article had it conformed with the warranty.
Park vs. R. & B. Co., 91 Wis. 189, 64 N. W. 859.
(c) Failur-e to Supply Goods or to Receive Same. Rule of
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damages: The difference between the contract price and the
amount the plaintiff would be required to pay elsewhere. Richard-
son vs. Chynoqweth, 26 Wis. 656.
(d) In Those Respecting Realty. Vendors failure to give title.
Rule i. Where the vendor has title and refuses to convey.
The damages are the fruits of the Bargain the plaintiff would
have received.
Rule 2. If the vendor believes in good faith that he has title
and later finds he has not-nominal damages only.
Rule 3. Where the vendor has no title and is aware of that
fact, damages are the loss of the bargain to the plaintiff. Arentsen
vs. Moreland, 122 Wis. 167, 99 N. W. 790.
(e) Breaches of Covenant of Seisin and Quiet Enjoyment.
The safest general rule in all actions on contract is to limit re-
covery as much as possible to an indemnity for the actual injury
sustained, without regard to profits.
Where there has been no fraud and a party is evicted from real
property on which he has a covenant of seisin and quiet enjoy-
ment, the rule of damages is only the sum paid with interest from
time of payment. Poposkey vs. Munkwitz, 68 Wis. 322, 32
N. W. 35.
(f) Breaches of Covenants Against Incumbrances. If the
incumbrance be of a permanent character, such as will impair the
value of the premises and cannot be removed by the purchaser as
a matter of right, the damages will be measured by the diminishhd
value of the premises thereby occasioned. Killilea vs. Douglas,
133 Wis. 140, 113 N. W. 411.
13. Actions Against Carriers.
For failure to deliver on time-where the carrier negligently
delays the delivery of goods. The rule of damages is that the
carrier is liable for the loss in the market value of the goods
during the delay. Peet vs. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 20 Wis. 594,
91 Am. Dec. 446.
For entire failure to deliver, the carrier is liable for the value
of the goods at the time and place they should have been delivered.
Nudd vs. Wells, I I Wis. 407; Thomas vs. Wabash, St. L. & P. R.
Co., 62 Wis. 642, 22 N. W. 827.*
FRANK T. LINKE, '24.
*See also "Exemplary Damages a Deformity in-Our Law." By Howard
A. Hartman in Marquette Law Review, Vol. 2, p. 57.-Ed.
